The Demographic Crisis  putin Style: russia Is Losing People Faster than Money

russia is entering a new phase of deep demographic crisis, much more dangerous than the one the country experienced at the turn of the 1990s and 2000s. While at that time the decline in birth rates and high mortality were offset by large-scale migration from post-soviet republics, this mechanism has now virtually disappeared. In the three decades since the collapse of the ussr, it was migration growth that made it possible to offset more than 70 % of the natural population decline, but today russia is losing its status as an attractive destination for labor migrants.

In 2024, only 1.22 million children were born in the rf, almost at the level of the historic low of 1999. A further decline of 3–5 % per year is expected in the coming years. To stabilize the situation, the fertility rate would have to increase from the current 1.4 to at least 1.7–1.8, which is impossible in the context of war, economic stagnation, and weak social support. The situation is complicated by population outflow and losses in the war against Ukraine. In addition, the aging of the population and the decline in young labor resources are becoming a critical challenge for the pension system and healthcare: the share of citizens aged 65+ has reached 18 % and continues to grow.

Instead of systemic family policy and healthcare support, the government of the rf is focusing on ideological campaigns – banning the LGBT movement, restricting abortions, or anti child-free rhetoric. Such measures are not capable of increasing the birth rate and only deepen social tensions.

Without migration inflows, by the year 2100, the rf’s population could shrink to 90 million, or to 57 million in a pessimistic scenario. Thus, the country is ending the demographic cycle of the putin era in much worse conditions than a quarter of a century ago, and future generations of russian leaders will inherit a protracted crisis with devastating consequences for the economy and social sphere.