The kremlin Invests in African Regimes of Situational Loyalty

Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are accelerating the institutional formation of the “Alliance of Sahel States” (AES) confederation, building their own security, finance, and information policy architecture outside Western formats. At the second AES summit, held on December 22–23 in Bamako, the leaders of the three countries announced the launch of joint armed forces, a development bank, and a confederation television channel.

A key security element is the joint FU-AES armed forces, numbering about 5,000 military personnel, formed from units of the armies of the three states. The forces will have a single command, coordination of ground, air, and intelligence components, and headquarters located in Niamey. Formally, their goal is to fight Islamist groups, but the model itself is positioned as an alternative to ECOWAS mechanisms and the Western security presence. This is happening against the background of worsening relations with Nigeria, which has traditionally been considered the main regional guarantor of security.

The economic pillar of the confederation is the AES Investment and Development Bank, with a statutory capital of 500 billion West African francs (approximately US$900 million) and headquarters in Bamako. It is presented as an instrument of “sovereign integration” for financing infrastructure and strategic projects without dependence on Western financial institutions. In parallel, a joint television channel, AES Television, was launched, whose first broadcast, with the participation of the leaders of the three countries, was clearly ideological in nature.

For moscow, this configuration opens up additional space for influence – in the areas of security, finance, and information – without formal commitments. At the same time, the very logic of the AES indicates that the Sahel countries seek to maintain maximum autonomy: using external partners on a situational basis, they retain full control over decisions. Local regimes are characterized by political inconsistency, rapid changes in priorities, and a pragmatic willingness to break agreements as soon as they lose their benefits. In this configuration, russia can increase its presence, but risks encountering the same practices of opportunism and betrayal that other external players faced in the past.