Forged Letters of the Leader of the OUN Shtul-Zhdanovych to His Father. KGB’s Writing
3/3/2023

The story of the third head of the OUN, Shtul-Zhdanovych, is a vivid example of how at all times the bodies of the NKVD/MGB/KGB of the USSR tried to compromise and discredit prominent figures of the Ukrainian national liberation movement. In the archival funds of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine, documentary evidence was found of how, by forging letters to his father, adding half-truths (or even outright lies) to real information, Moscow cast a shadow over one of the leaders of Ukrainian emigration, spreading fabrications about his alleged cooperation with Soviet state security bodies, thereby sowing distrust and discord among Ukrainians, and against this background trying to inflict an irreparable blow to the Ukrainian national idea.
In the Underground and Hitler's Concentration Camp
The case against Oleh Shtul-Zhdanovych was opened by the 4th Directorate of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR on May 11, 1944. In the first documents attached to the case, which was given the operational name “Osyp”, he still appeared simply as Zhdanovych. One of the references stated that “Zhdanovych is a party pseudonym, his real name is supposedly Oleh Shtul”. Besides, it was reported that he is an “active Ukrainian nationalist of the Melnyk wing and is carrying out counterrevolutionary work against the Soviet government..., a member of the Political Council of military formations of Ukrainian nationalists, who call themselves the “Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army – UPRA”, who set themselves the task of fighting the Red Army to create an independent Ukrainian democratic state”.
Having analyzed a number of printed publications of the OUN, in particular the newspaper in which O. Shtul was published under the pseudo Zhdanovych, the NKVD employees concluded that he “is the leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists of Melnyk’s wing of eastern regions of Ukraine”. This was already enough for an operational case to be opened against him. There were many similar cases against the figures of the Ukrainian national liberation movement, dated 1944. Directives from Moscow clearly indicated that this category of persons posed a serious threat to the very existence of Soviet power. Therefore, they were subject to search and immediate arrest.
But it was not easy to arrest O. Shtul-Zhdanovych (it was under this spelling that his surname would mostly be known in all post-war years). At the time of the start of the case, he was in Hitler's Sachsenhausen concentration camp. For six months, from December 1943, he was held in solitary confinement. Later he was transferred to the cell to Otaman Taras Bulba-Borovets – the former Commander of the UPA-“Polissya Sich” and the leader of the UPRA. As T. Bulba-Borovets recalled, on June 10, 1944, they learned that at night the Nazis had frozen Oleh Olzhych-Kandyba to death. He wrote in his memoirs: “To us, it meant that we are all in for liquidation. Sotnyk “Zhdanovych” was especially worried about Olzhych's death, because they were close friends. Although there were already two of us, the nervous tension was growing with each minute coming”.
The archival documents do not contain detailed information about O. Shtul -Zhdanovych's stay in the concentration camp. There is only information about how he was arrested. According to the testimonies of persons detained and interrogated by the NKGB officers, in late 1943 or early 1944, he, together with T. Bulba-Borovets, returned from Warsaw, where he was on business, and then they were arrested by the Gestapo on the way and transported to Berlin, and from there – to a concentration camp.
Information about cooperation with T. Bulba-Borovets, obtained by the Chekists, was not in favor of O. Shtul-Zhdanovych. Moreover, information was received that he was sent to strengthen cooperation with the “Polissya Sich” by Colonel Andriy Melnyk himself and that he was either an assistant or deputy commander of the UPRA for political issues and edited the insurgent newspaper “Defense of Ukraine”. And before that, in 1941-1943, he headed the cultural referentura of the OUN(M) Provid (Leadership - Transl.) in central and eastern lands of Ukraine, and in general since pre-war years he had been an active member of the OUN, had friendly relations with Olena Teliha, Yevhen Malaniuk, Oleh Olzhych and other figures.
In the process of investigation, the Chekists at first managed to find only some disparate information about A. Shtul-Zhdanovych, but they failed to trace him. Instead, they found his father, the Volhynian clergyman Danylo Shtul.
“At Church He Spoke More About Ukraine, than About the Mother of God”
It was quite easy for the Chekists to find Father Danylo Shtul in Volyn, although he had changed several parishes during priestly work under Poland (before 1939). Not the least role in such changes was played by his active pro-Ukrainian position, which the then authorities did not like. According to eyewitnesses, in the church he spoke more about Ukraine than about the Mother of God, and not so much about Jesus Christ as about Taras Shevchenko. He was an educated and well-read person, he knew the history of Ukraine well, so he often combined his sermons with excursuses into the past. For this purpose, he often used the brochure of his eldest son Oleh “Centuries Speaking”, a kind of summary of the history of Ukraine, and the newspaper edited by his younger son Vasyl. He was very proud of his sons.
Under Soviet rule, D. Shtul retained his pro-Ukrainian position, as evidenced by archival documents. Fellow villagers recalled that an embroidered trident always hung in his house. And during the Second World War, as stated in one of the papers of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR, he “joined the autocephalous trend and was appointed dean of church parishes of autocephalous orientation in Zabolottivskyi district of Volyn region”. At that time he also “participated in the consecration of the Ukrainian nationalist flag”, “spoke to parishioners with anti-Soviet nationalist calls”.
Therefore, after the liberation of Western Ukrainian lands from Hitler's occupation, Father Shtul immediately came to the attention of the NKGB. They opened a case on him and began to collect compromising materials. Soon they arrested him in the church, they did not even allow him to say goodbye to his wife. The investigation did not last long. On May 9, 1945, the Military Tribunal of the Ministry of Internal Affairs sentenced him to 10 years for anti-Soviet propaganda. To serve his sentence, he was sent to the so-called correctional labor camp “Dubrovlag”.
Among the archival documents there is an extract from the protocol of interrogation of D. Shtul dated July 24, 1945. It contains information about his son Oleh. Apparently, the camp workers fulfilled the request from the 4th Directorate of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR. Danylo Shtul reported well-known information: about his son's studies at the University of Warsaw at the Faculty of History and Philology, teaching in one of the Warsaw gymnasiums, working during the Second World War in Ukrainian newspapers in Krakow, Rivne, Kovel. There is not a single word about cooperation with the OUN. “In April 1943”, the interrogation protocol reads, “he left Kovel for Czechoslovakia, Prague, and since then I have no information about him”.
Having served his sentence, D. Shtul returned to Volyn. Soon he was transferred along the church line to the village of Barmashove, Bashtanskyi district (now the village of Bilozirka, Vitovskyi district) of Mykolaiv region and appointed abbot of the local parish and dean of the Bashtanskyi district. At the same time, the KGB established operational surveillance over him.
By that time, they already had information that after the war A. Shtul-Zhdanovych lived first in Germany and Austria, and in 1948 he moved to Paris, became the editor of the newspaper “Ukrainian Word”, which consolidated the Ukrainian diaspora in France, joined the Provid of Ukrainian Nationalists and headed the press and information referentura of the Provid of the OUN(M).
In 1957, Father Daniel, after a long break, received the first letters from Oleh. From them he learned that his son got married and already had two children – daughter Antonina and son Daniel. At the same time, those letters were first read in the district department of the KGB. Soon the idea of recruiting the clergyman matured in order to learn through him about his son's life and plans abroad and, on an acceptable opportunity, to persuade him to return to the USSR and abandon political activity. But the deeper they studied Father Daniel, the better they realized that this would not work.
Eventually they gave up the idea of recruiting. But they did not leave him alone. If nothing else, he was an important and indispensable link in the cultivation of O. Shtul- Zhdanovych. They found other relatives who were more accommodating and could travel abroad through scientific exchange or as tourists. KGB officers resorted to all sorts of fabrications in order to bring them together with Father Danylo in Mykolaiv region. But it was very awkward. Then they decided to transfer the clergyman to Kyiv.
This is stated in one of the documents of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR of November 12, 1958: “Taking into consideration that the main aim of our work on Shtul Oleh is to persuade him to cooperate with state security agencies or return to the USSR for the purpose of subsequent use for compromising the leaders of foreign anti-Soviet nationalist formations and that the solution of these issues will be largely influenced by the economic situation and morale of Oleh's father, who lives in the USSR, we decided to create conditions for the gradual advancement of Shtul Daniel in the service. To this end, we, through the Exarch of Ukraine Ioan, in October this year, transferred Shtul D.I. from the village of Barmashove, Mykolaiv region, to the Kyiv diocese, where Shtul was appointed clergyman of the Naberezhno-Nikolska Church of Kyiv”.
Soon Protopresbyter Danylo Shtul became the clergyman of the Holy Intercession Church in Solomianka. As before, all the letters that his son sent him passed through the KGB offices, where they were carefully studied and copied. Agents repeatedly visited him, trying to learn as much as possible about his son and their relationship. One of the agent’s reports pretty upset KGB employees. It pointed out the following:
“He doesn't want Oleh to return to the Soviet Union. He believes that Oleh is a very great man in the West, he is trusted, as evidenced by his trips abroad, in particular to Rome. If Oleh returned, it would mean betraying the cause he serves, and no one loves traitors or trusts them. Shtul believes that the return of his son is tantamount to treason, and he would not want his son to be a traitor. Hence, he does not persuade his son to return...”
Therefore, Danylo Shtul did not meet the expectations of KGB officers. Repeated attempts to persuade Oleh Shtul-Zhdanovych to abandon active political activity or return to the USSR did not give the expected results. Such work was carried out through agents, which were brought to him abroad, and through officials along the lines of cultural ties. The blackmail attempt did not work either. He was once hinted that his father might have problems if his son “wrote bad articles”, including never being appointed bishop, which he allegedly seeks. O. Shtul-Zhdanovych responded to this that he did not write anything bad at all.
After that, Moscow sent a letter, signed by the Chief of the First Main Directorate of the KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers, Aleksandr Sakharovsky, addressed to the Chief of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR Vitaliy Nikitchenko, with the following conclusions: “The newspaper “Ukrainian Word”, edited by “Osyp”, continues to publish angry anti-Soviet articles, and we do not have any information that would indicate a change in “Osyp”’s nationalist beliefs. In this regard, to raise the question of recruiting “Osyp”, in our opinion, is impractical”.
After that, the intention to recruit O. Shtul-Zhdanovych, which almost always was in the KGB’s plans for active figures of the Ukrainian emigration, was finally abandoned. And Chekists moved on to the next stage.
“To Take Measures to Compromise As an Agent of the KGB”
After the death of the leader of the Provid of Ukrainian Nationalists Andriy Melnyk in 1964, Oleh Shtul-Zhdanovych served as acting head of the PUN. In October 1965, he was elected the head of the PUN. Then twice more, in 1970 and 1974, he was re-elected to this position. All that time he was in sight of the KGB. Moreover, he was followed even more meticulously, and for a good reason.
The KGB's report to the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR of November 17, 1972, addressed to the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, read:
“Shtul is one of the main spokesmen of ideological concepts of Ukrainian nationalism... Having led the OUN-s (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Solidarists – Note), Shtul significantly strengthened the Organization, raised its authority among Ukrainian emigrants, and intensified anti-Soviet activities. OUN-s was the first to get anti-Soviet so-called “Samvydav” (“Self-publishing”- Transl.) documents from Ukraine. Melnykites’ 1967 publication abroad of V. Chornovil's “Woe from Wit”, in fact, began a new direction in the anti-Soviet activities of foreign nationalist centers – publishing materials from “samvydav”.
Then it reads about the measures that the KGB took regarding O. Shtul-Zhdanovych, and the conclusion was drawn: “The measures taken showed that Shtul stands firmly on hostile, nationalist positions and cannot be used operationally”.
Therefore, V. Shcherbytskyi was informed that in 1971, measures were taken against A. Shtul-Zhdanovych to compromise him as an alleged KGB agent. That is, what they could not achieve, they decided to demonstrate as a fait accompli. At the first stage, a leaflet was made and distributed abroad, accusing him of collaborating with Soviet partisans during the Second World War. In particular, the KGB falsified information that “Shtul, being during the war in Borovets’ national formations in Volyn, participated in negotiations with the representative of the Medvedev partisan group, a Chekist Lukin, as a result of which an agreement on neutrality was reached between the Melnykites’ gangs of the OUN and the Soviet partisans, passwords were worked out, etc.”.
Through its channels, the KGB sent this information to newspapers published by representatives of another OUN movement – supporters of Stepan Bandera, which caused a new wave of hostility between Melnykites and Banderites. But they did not stop there and immediately moved on to the second stage in order to reinforce the fictitious information that the new leader of the PUN kept in touch with Soviet representatives in the post-war period.
The idea of this so-called active measure is set out in a letter sent for approval to the First Main Directorate of the KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers. It describes in detail the mechanism and ways of compromising. “For this purpose”, the document from Kyiv to Moscow said, “the existing correspondence between Shtul and his father, who previously lived in Kyiv (died in 1967), is used. In the handwriting of O. Shtul, two letters and three inserts to the texts of his letters will be made, the content of which gives reason to believe that Shtul for a long time maintained contact with the KGB authorities through his father”.
In the first completely forged letter, along with general information about life in Paris and family affairs, KGB officers attributed to O. Shtul-Zhdanovych fictitious information that it was thanks to his efforts that through the right people it was possible to transfer his father to Kyiv. And this is confirmed by the key phrase: “If I have a chance, I will sincerely thank the people who did it”.
And here's a phrase from another letter: “Pass over this second package, in which I lay out some of my views on organizational matters, to our mutual friend, and also tell him that it would be very helpful for us if they mention me from time to time in their publications distributed here. In other words, the more they write against me, the more I will benefit”.
In the operational plan of the KGB, this is presented as follows: “The second text of 15.08.1961 refers to passing over to a certain person in Kyiv the materials about the activities of Ukrainian nationalist organizations and some measures that we supposedly have to take to facilitate Shtul’s working conditions.
Such notes, according to KGB officers, should have indicated that O. Shtul-Zhdanovych played some kind of double game and had ties with Soviet authorities. The same opinion was fueled in inserts to those letters that the KGB once intercepted, made photocopies of them and kept in the case file. The necessary phrases were placed at the end of the page in a place free of text.
In one letter there is an insert: “If you have an opportunity, ask my friends why they did not take advantage of my trip to Switzerland. I had hoped to meet someone and consult”.
In another: “I ask you, make sure to let our friend read this letter. I would really like to thank him for the gifts. I apologize to you, but I can't explain anything to you now, let's hope that the time comes and we will be able to frankly tell each other a lot of interesting things”.
This was just the first stage of the operational plan. After that, letters on behalf of an anonymous author, a Ukrainian émigré in England, were sent to several newspapers edited by supporters of another OUN movement – Banderites. Anonymous reported that in 1970 he visited Kyiv, where he visited the flat of Shtul's father and received letters from his former housekeeper that allegedly compromised the leader of the PUN.
All these falsified letters, inserts with the necessary phrases, made in the handwriting of O. Shtul-Zhdanovych, documents detailing how this was done, were kept in the archival funds of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine. At first glance, it is difficult to tell real handwriting from fake. Only an official expertise by professionals could draw the appropriate conclusion. The KGB feared this. The recommendations from Moscow instructed to send only copies. Operational documents on this subject stated: “The originals of the manufactured letters were not sent to prevent Shtul’s conducting graphic expertise of the identity of his handwriting”.
The publication of these forgeries in a number of foreign newspapers, as predicted by the KGB, caused considerable publicity, discussion and a wave of accusations. The letter addressed to Oleg Kalugin, chief of the “K” Department of the First Main Directorate of the KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers, dated August 2, 1973, points out that “this measure was supposed to strengthen the contradictions between the Melnykites and Banderites and compromise the Melnyk organization itself and its leader” and that “the active measures taken to compromise O. Shtul-Zhdanovych have achieved their goal”.
But the Provid of Ukrainian Nationalists immediately issued a rebuttal. The communique pointed out that this was a provocation of the KGB, to which it should be responded accordingly, and also called for “increasing sensitivity and rebuffing real agents whose activity will intensify”.
Therefore, although the KGB reported that the provocation had succeeded, not everything went according to the plan. Despite all the expectations of the Chekists, in 1974 O. Shtul-Zhdanovych was elected Head of the Provid of Ukrainian Nationalists for the third time. And he did not change his convictions and intentions to fight for Ukraine's independence, for unity in the ranks of Ukrainians, and became one of the co-founders of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians.
Then the KGB resorted to another provocative action. In a letter addressed to Oleg Kalugin, the chief of the “K” department of the First Main Directorate of the KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers, dated December 17, 1974, a proposal was made “to take measures to increase hostility between Foreign Units of the OUN and the OUN-s”. “We consider it appropriate”, the document said, “to send a letter to the newspaper of Melnykites “Novyi Shlyakh” (Canada) on behalf of an anonymous author about the alleged terrorist act against “'Osyp”, which is being prepared by Banderites. It is assumed that the content of the letter will thus become known to a wide range of Melnykites, cause a backlash on their part to Bandera, compromise the leaders of the OUN Foreign Units, bring nervousness into the personal life of “Osyp” and in a certain way paralyze his anti-Soviet nationalist activities”.
The anonymous letter to the editor of the “Novyi Shlyakh” created in the offices of the KGB, was also kept in the archives of the Intelligence. Like other documents, it is now a clear evidence of how, under the meticulous leadership from Moscow, special operations were purposefully conducted to discredit and intimidate the leaders of the Ukrainian national liberation movement, incite contradictions and hostility in its ranks, violate unity and cohesion, and therefore make them give up fighting for the existence of the Ukrainian state. At this, they tried to resort even to such methods as using the father against the son, blackmailing with the fate of relatives and friends, forging letters, threatening with reprisal and many others.
Quite eloquent and relevant about all this is a quote from the PUN communiqué:
“Having launched a new offensive against the forces of the National Revival in the Native Lands, inflicting heavy blows on the most conscious strata of the Ukrainian people in Ukraine, Red Moscow has launched an unusually broad attack on Ukrainian emigration, which from the depths of its heart responded to the manifestations of indestructibility of its brothers and sisters in Ukraine. This response of emigration morally supports the fighters for self-preservation and shows the world the true face of the USSR as a Moscow prison of peoples and an enemy of freedom of all mankind.
...This offensive aims to weaken the morality of Ukrainians in a foreign land by dispersing them, paralyzing their actions through decomposition, distracting from the problems of the Native Lands, spreading disbelief in the forces of our people, re-emphasizing the forces of the enemy, which would lead to the conclusion about the “hopelessness of the struggle”, about the “voluntariness of Russification”, about the “indifference of the people to national problems”, about “non-exposure to danger” of people in Ukraine, etc.
... Therefore, the PUN calls on all Ukrainians in foreign lands not to succumb to provocations, to eliminate internal fronts, to coordinate their efforts as much as possible, in particular, to coordinate the fight against the enemy’s provocations that have been multiplying recently and which are aimed at paralyzing the Ukrainian community”.
(Source: BSA of the SZR of Ukraine. – F. 1. – Case 13092)