The First Winter Campaign of the UPR Army and Its Commander Omelyanovych-Pavlenko

The archives of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine contain materials about the First Winter Campaign of the UPR Army (December 6, 1919 – May 6, 1920) into the rear of the Red and Volunteer Armies, during which the Ukrainian Army successfully used raid methods of fighting numerous enemies and which, according to military historians, is the most heroic page of military art of the period of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1921. These documents are kept in a multivolume case against Otaman Yurko Tyutyunnyk and a separate case-form on Mikhailo Omelyanovych-Pavlenko, who led the legendary Campaign.

The most valuable among these documents is the manuscript of the book by Khorunzhyi (Lieutenant- Transl.) General Yurko Tyutyunnyk “The Winter Campaign of 1919-20”. This is a handwritten text by him with a number of edits and editorial marks. The book itself was published in 1923. In the preface to it, the author wrote: “Using a short and relative rest, I am taking up the pen. I have set myself the task of presenting the course of the struggle of the Ukrainian Army and the population for national liberation during the winter of 1919-1920 and parts of the spring of 1920... Few documents about this period of struggle can be found in the government archives. The documents hidden in personal archives are gradually dying. Time passes, and the participants in the struggle forget the facts. The great and invaluable experience, bought with the blood of the best sons of the people, can be lost to the general public of the nation. The experience of the struggle is the most precious national treasure, and we must pass it on intact to the younger generations who are to replace us in the future stages of the struggle”.

Yurko Tyutyunnyk pointed out that he wrote the book on the basis of documents and facts that he had at his disposal, or which were known to him as one of the leaders of the Campaign. “I divide the work into three parts”, he explained his plan. – In the first part, I give perhaps a full political overview, the second will contain combat events, the organization of the army; I will describe my personal observations and impressions in part three...

In my work I use the following sources:

Orders and instructions for the Army and Divisions.

Reports- operational, intelligence and political.

Official letters and statements of government figures. Documents seized from enemies and intercepted radio reports. Periodical and non-periodical press”.

Individual orders, administrative documents, letters, postcards related to the Campaign are kept in the archival funds of the Intelligence. In the 1920s, they fell into the hands of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR as a result of a special operation, when Otaman Tyutyunnyk was tricked into Soviet territory into a pre-prepared trap, arrested, used for propaganda purposes, and then shot dead. Recently, the documents were declassified, digitized and handed over by the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine to historians and scientists for further study. At the same time, turning to them, as well as to other unknown documents from intelligence archive funds on the eve of the commemoration of the date of the start of the First Winter Campaign, makes it possible to take a new look at the events of a century ago from the perspective of today.

The course of those events is now known both from Yurko Tyutyunnyk's book and from the memoirs of the Campaign Commander M. Omelyanovych-Pavlenko and other commanders and rank-and-file participants. In general the situation was as follows.

At the end of November 1919, the remnants of the Ukrainian army found themselves in the so-called “triangle of death” - a small patch of territory near the towns of Chudniv and Lubar (now Zhytomyr region), surrounded by the Red, Volunteer and Polish armies. At that time, reconciliation was achieved with the Poles. The Command of the UPR troops faced a choice: either move to Polish territory and be interned, or seek a compromise with the Bolsheviks, or continue the struggle. At the military meeting, they came to the conclusion that it was impossible to continue the front-line war with the regular army. So they decided to conduct a raid on the Ukrainian territory with combat-capable units through the rear of the Bolsheviks and Denikinites, and in the spring to raise an uprising in all of Ukraine.

The Winter Campaign, as it was later called in historical documents, began on December 6, 1919. According to different estimates, 5,000 to 10,000 people took part in it. The combat composition of the units was approximately 2000 bayonets, 1000 sabers and 14 guns, the rest - headquarters, non-commissioned units, carts and even the wounded who wanted to be useful for the general cause.

Khorunzhyi General Mykhailo Volodymyrovych Omelyanovych-Pavlenko became the Commander of the UPR Army, and Yuriy Yosypovych Tyutyunnyk became his Deputy, who at the same time served as the Chief of the Combined Kyiv (Rifle) Division. As noted in the researches and memoirs of the participants of the events of that time, on the very first day of the offensive, the front of the White Guard troops of Anton Denikin's Volunteer Army was broken through. The first liberated district town was Lypovets, whose residents greeted the unexpected arrival of the Ukrainian Army with indescribable joy. The news that the Ukrainian Army does exist and is actively operating quickly spread throughout Ukraine and caused excitement among the population and demoralization among Denikin’s troops. Therefore, the Volunteer Army began to retreat to the Black Sea.

“The authority of the Army, which took such a crazy ( from the point of view of theory) step, was growing”, Yu. Tyutyunnyk wrote in his memoirs. “...The Ukrainian Government had the force of several thousand soldiers fanatically devoted to the national idea and of many tens of thousands of insurgents who, having neither a developed plan nor an order, beat both White and Red Russians”.

To characterize the moods that prevailed among the White Guards, Yu. Tyutyunnyk cites an excerpt of a conversation between a member of the Russian commission on the “accounting of military plunder”, scientist Kosinsky, and a clergyman of the village of S. near Uman. “Tell me, for God's sake”, Kosinsky said to the clergyman, “what they want, these Ukrainians? They lost, we beat them. But, no! Without a base, without a government, and apparently without any idea, they go and cut us on their way... What stubbornness! They die themselves, but they also kill us. They are actually helping the Reds, who are not friends of the Ukrainians either... I can explain their actions as just a desire to die. What are they: Tyutyunnyk, Pavlenko and others? Intellectuals, people, animals?... It would be better to put up with them in due time”.

According to Yu. Tyutyunnyk, to the White Guards, the Ukrainian army “became scarier than a cat to a rat”. “The same Odesa newspapers”, he noted, “that a month ago told a giddy “truly Russian man” that the Ukrainian Army was done with, that it no longer existed, now wrote extraordinary things about us. In our Army and its leaders, they found such qualities that we ourselves sometimes did not even suspect... After all the funerals, liquidations and “does-not-exist”, a poor citizen of the “Armed Forces of the South of Russia” would read: “Between us and the Bolsheviks, there is a never defeated by anyone, a well-trained and disciplined Ukrainian Regular Army under the command of Khorunzhyi General Omelyanovych-Pavlenko’s General Staff. To the right of this Army, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army operates under the command of the “brave cavalryman” and the famous organizer of “all sorts of uprisings” Colonel Tyutyunnyk!

It is not known, on the basis of what data the new “Ukrainophiles” believed that we would all of a sudden make a “close alliance” with the Russians. While shooting our prisoners of war for “betrayed motherland”, the Russians in their mass had no idea that we were implacable enemies of Russia. The complete opposite of the interests of the Ukrainian nation and of the Russian nation was beyond the minds of the politicians of the “Armed Forces”.

The memoirs of the participants of the First Winter Campaign say that the groups moved along different routes, destroying the occupation authorities and military units of the Volunteer and Bolshevik armies in Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv and other Ukrainian regions. A total of 2,500 kilometers were covered with battles. It is pointed out that the population eagerly awaited the arrival of Ukrainian troops and even sent its envoys from Poltava, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Melitopol.

Among the archival documents of the Intelligence, there is a number of documents related to the events of that time. In particular, the report to the Commander of the Kyiv Division, signed on December 24, 1919 in the village of Pyatyhory, Kyiv region, by “the head of the operational department of the staff of the Zaporizhzhya army, sotnyk (signature illegible). It tells about the consequences of the battle with units of the Volunteer Army, namely: “The Unit of the Black Zaporizhzhians Regiment captured the town of Stavyshche after the fight, having driven away a detachment of volunteers up to 250 people. There have been taken: 21 prisoners of war, 2 nurses, 9 wagons, 3 machine guns, horses, saddles and a lot of property. Many volunteers were killed. From our side, one was killed” (BSA of the SZR of Ukraine. - F. 1. - Case 11012. - V. 26. – P. 17).

Among the successes, researchers point out the victorious battle for Uman on March 19, 1920. According to eyewitnesses, the city was liberated amid the joyous moods of the population, and the captured Bolshevik orchestra continuously played the anthem “Ukraine’s Glory and Freedom Have Not Died Yet”.

The biggest trophies were won in the battle near Voznesensk on April 16, 1920, where Ukrainian units demonstrated ingenuity and courage in the confrontation with the 14th Bolshevik army, which was significantly superior in all components. The Bolshevik Communist Congress was being held in the city, and its delegates significantly strengthened the position of the Reds. The difficulty of the offensive was that the Ukrainian units, due to their separation from their bases, did not have the needed number of weapons and ammunition. In particular, the Zaporizhzhian Infantry Regiment went on the attack half without guns, clapping their hands and thereby creating a noise effect of shooting. They even resorted to this trick in order not to lose the initiative in the rapid advance. They also decided to attack at three o'clock in the morning, in a thick fog.

The course of the battle was finally broken by the cavalrymen, who suddenly jumped out from behind the hills in front of the infantry and began to cut down the enemies. The latter in a panic left their weapons, supplies, and ammunition and fled the city. As a result of that attack, ours managed to capture 28 cannons, 32,000 cannon cartridges, 48 ​​machine guns, 5,000 rifles and 2,000,000 cartridges, 4,000 horse carts with clothes, shoes and other things. About a hundred of the Red Army soldiers surrendered without resistance. At least three hundred people of the Bolshevik army were destroyed on the battlefield. The Ukrainian Army’s two servicemen were killed and five were wounded.

The order to the troops of the UPR Army, which is kept in the archival funds of the Intelligence, dated April 16, 1920, reads as follows:

“I. The city of Voznesensk was taken after a stubborn fight; captured huge plunder, which must be used.

II. I order: 1) Zap.(Zaporizhzhian- Transl) Cavalry Regiment will immediately begin to fulfill its task of providing a bridgehead along the railway in the direction of Odesa (Order, P. 65). 2) Cavalry Brigade, immediately after crossing over, to occupy the area to ensure the bridgehead according to Order. P. 65, keeping in touch with the Cavalry Zapor. Regiment. 3) Kyiv Division to immediately proceed to the crossing of the Bug and secure the bridgehead by supporting the cavalry. With the Army’s crossing the river, to concentrate in the Chertalka-Moldovka area. 4) Zaporizhzhian Division to keep order in the city and secure the city and the crossing separately from the east and the north until the evening of the 17th of April, conducting close reconnaissance...” (BSA of the SZR of Ukraine. - F. 1. - Case 11012. - V. 26. - P. 94 ).

In more detail, all the events of that time are described in Mykhailo Omelyanovych-Pavlenko’s memoirs. Those memoirs are not in the archival funds of the Intelligence. Instead, there are repeated references to the General in many operational documents of the OGPU-NKVD of the USSR of the 1920s and 1930s. He appears as an active figure of the UPR emigration, a combat General who did not accept the defeat of the Ukrainian national liberation movement and did his best to restore the independence of Ukraine.

A separate case-form against M. Omelyanovych-Pavlenko, as evidenced by archival intelligence funds, was opened by the NKGB on November 13, 1943. It contains only isolated references to the General's participation in the First Winter Campaign. In particular, one of the papers dated March 25, 1950 states:

“At the head of the UPR army, he participated in the “winter campaign”, fighting for the Ukrainian nation. Conducted more than 50 battles and clashes and was awarded the Order of the Iron Cross. He directed military operations against the Soviet troops (1920). For this, he was promoted to the rank of Colonel General.

In 1921, he was elected to the post of Minister of Military Affairs. In exile, he writes works on military issues, various notes and memoirs.

During the German occupation, together with Metropolitan A. Sheptytsky, President A. Livytskyi, Colonel A. Melnyk and others, he signed a memorandum to Hitler, condemning Hitler's policy in Ukraine. Despite his age, he is interested in public life and takes an active part in it” (BSA of the SZR of Ukraine. - F. 1. - Case 9719. – P. 57).

At the time of filing the case-form, M. Omelyanovych-Pavlenko headed the Ukrainian Free Cossacks. Immediately after the war, in the camps for displaced persons on the territory of Germany, he founded and led the Union of Ukrainian Warriors – a veteran organization whose aim was to unite Ukrainian veterans who found themselves in the territories outside the Soviet occupation. In 1945–1948, he served as the Minister of Military Affairs of the Ukrainian People's Republic in exile. The Ukrainian government in exile promoted him to the rank of Colonel General. M. Omelyanovych- Pavlenko died on May 29, 1952 in Paris and was buried at Père Lachaise Cemetery.

Cultivation of M. Omelyanovych-Pavlenko, as evidenced by archival documents, was carried out superficially. Apparently, due to the lack of agent positions in his close circle and serious illness in the last years of his life, when he could no longer be as active as before. During that period the MGB of the USSR switched its attention to Mykola Kapustyanskyi, who replaced him as the Minister of Military Affairs of the Ukrainian People's Republic, and developed special measures to eliminate the new head of the military department.

The last document in the case-form on M. Omelyanovych-Pavlenko is a copy of the newspaper “Ukrainske Slovo” (“Ukrainian Word”) dated June 8, 1952 with a notice of his death, condolences and an obituary. In all the materials, he is mentioned with respect as the “unforgettable Leader of the glorious Winter Campaign”. In particular, the following is pointed out in the article about the life path of the deceased under the signature of the USS (Ukrainian Sich Riflemen):

“In the time of the disaster at the fronts, the General is going on a Winter Campaign, which glorified Ukrainian weapons… Although the field army was significantly reduced, under the command of General Omelyanovych-Pavlenko it showed the highest fighting elasticity and the capability of maneuvering. It is true that the General was the most loved by the warriors, which gave him the honorary title “Grandfather”! No wonder, we were all too young and General Omelyanovych-Pavlenko with his beard, looked old to us even though he was only 40 years old at the time... In the first place, what was special about the late General, was his constant fighting spirit. Always, even in the most unfavorable circumstances, he fought, did not think, did not hesitate whether to engage his name in a hopeless operation... It was his nature, it was his soul, he had no split. At any moment he was ready to fight, to advance. It was the content of his life”.

The analysis of documents, memoirs, testimonies of participants of the First Winter Campaign made it possible for researchers to conclude that even under unfavorable conditions and in winter, it is possible to successfully beat the enemy on one’s land with the support of own people. The Winter Campaign contributed to the significant rise of the spirit of the Army and national consciousness among the masses of the Ukrainian population. Thanks to that Campaign, the so – called “white movement of the defendants of the single and inseparable Russia” was finally compromised. The Ukrainian population realized the true essence of its slogans. The Winter Campaign also laid the traditions of successful armed struggle in the rear of the enemy, which was repeatedly used in different periods of Ukrainian history.