The Unknown Plan for Assassination of Stepan Bandera
10/15/2022
The Branch State Archives of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine contain materials, hitherto unknown to the general public, about the preparation by the NKGB bodies at the end of 1944 of the operation to liquidate one of the leaders of Ukrainian nationalists Stepan Bandera in Berlin. The plan of special measures of the 4th Directorate of the NKSB of the Ukrainian SSR, certificates, diagrams and other documents published for the first time make it possible to significantly supplement the history of the attempts and assassination of the leader of the so-called revolutionary wing of the OUN and to reveal the mechanisms of the activity of the Soviet special services aimed at destroying the Ukrainian national liberation movement.
Researchers of the life of Stepan Bandera often mention seven (some – even ten) attempted assassinations - from the late 1940s to 1959. This was also confirmed in memoirs of his associates who were directly responsible for his safety and participated in the prevention of threats. At the same time, until now, there was no information in open sources about one more, the very first episode. This information is among the materials of the case-form on S. Bandera entitled “Kashalot” in the archives of the SZRU.
The documents are dated November-December 1944. At that time, the 35-year-old Bandera was in Berlin under the supervision of the Gestapo. The Nazis released him and a number of other OUN leading figures from the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, intending to attract him to their side in further confrontation with the USSR. In the concentration camp, in a block for especially important political prisoners, he was held since the autumn of 1941 (according to other sources – since 1942). He was arrested by the German security agencies on July 5, 1941 in Krakow and Germans demanded his revocation of the Act of Proclamation of the Ukrainian State (June 30, 1941) and moving to cooperation with the Third Reich. The restoration of Ukraine and its independence was not part of Hitler's Germany's plans. But Bandera then rejected the offer. At the end of the war, a different situation developed.
According to the Inelligence’s archival documents and other sources, on October 18, 1944, a meeting was held in Berlin, which was attended by Andriy Livytskyi, Pavlo Skoropadskyi, Stepan Bandera and Andriy Melnyk. They considered the proposals of the Germans to create a Ukrainian National Committee that would represent Ukrainians in Germany. They decided to authorize Colonel Andriy Melnyk to lead the UNC after its creation and to conduct direct negotiations with the German side.
A. Melnyk, who, after the split of OUN, headed the so - called moderate wing of the Organization, on the eve of October 17, 1944, was released from the Sachsenhausen concentration camp and brought to Berlin, where he was under house arrest. During November – December 1944, Ukrainian leaders were negotiating and trying to find mutual understanding. In the end, they put forward, among other things, the following conditions to the German side: the German government will sign and announce the declaration that Germany once and for all renounces all kinds of claims to Ukrainian lands and recognizes the right of the Ukrainian people to an independent state; besides, all Ukrainians arrested for political or national reasons should be released from concentration camps and prisons.
But the Hitlerites did not want to take into consideration the statehood aspirations of representatives of Ukrainian emigrants. Therefore, the negotiations at the end of December 1944 stopped. At this, A. Melnyk resigned and, together with his inner circle, began to make plans on how to act after the end of the war and on whom to focus in the new situation. In particular – how to secretly and as soon as possible leave Berlin - a zone of future active hostilities.
Those events became known to the 4th (Intelligence) Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR through agents embedded into the environment of the leaders of the OUN. Therefore, in the depths of the Directorate, a plan had matured to take advantage of the opportunity, in particular, the rapid advance of the Red Army, and sending of reconnaissance and sabotage groups to the deep rear of Hitler's Germany, and try to simultaneously liquidate the Kremlin's long-standing bitter enemies – leading figures of Ukrainian emigration circles.
As for Stepan Bandera, the case against him was started on February 10, 1941. At least this is evidenced by the documents that are stored in the archives of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine. The case was built by the 5th (Intelligence) Department of the State Security Directorate of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR. Then, in 1944, they added to it copies and originals of a number of documents in which S. Bandera appeared earlier and which were found at that time. In particular, immediately after the decision to start the case, there is a notification from Moscow signed by Deputy Chief of the 5th Department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR Pavel Sudoplatov dated February 1, 1940 about S. Bandera's stay in Rome.
“Bandera S. A. negotiated with the Italian government”, P. Sudoplatov reported, “about Italy's assistance in the anti-Soviet struggle and sought to obtain weapons for transportation to Western Ukraine.
Bandera S. A., on January 27 this year, left, allegedly, for Berlin, to move illegally to Western Ukraine from there, as he himself stated. He has a fake German passport, for what surname – not known” (BSA of the SZR of Ukraine. – F. 1. – Case. 10876. – V. 1. –P. 4).
As part of the measures to collect intelligence on S. Bandera, the NKVD authorities even found a man who for two months in 1937-1938 sat with him in the Polish prison “Holy Cross” for participating in the organization of the murder of the Minister of the Interior of Poland Bronisław Pieracki. They wanted to know everything – description of appearance, views, statements, information about family and friends. The cellmate, who in the case file is mentioned as source “F”, reported the following:
“Bandera in prison had great authority in the circle of his like-minded people – Ukrainian nationalists and those who sympathized with them.
He had a great oratorical talent and knew how to unite Ukrainians around himself.
Short in stature, about 25 years old, the upper jaw went significantly beyond the lower one, so his upper lip was always slightly raised and his teeth were visible. He rarely laughed, was gloomy and serious, and loved to hum nationalist songs.
All the nationalists who were in the “Holy Cross”, were placed in separate cells, but despite this, Bandera kept in touch with them through notes written on narrow pieces of cigarette paper.
During discussions on political topics, he was ecstatic. He always spoke Ukrainian, even with the prison administration. His father is a clergyman”.
(BSA of the SZR of Ukraine. – F. 1. – Case. 10876. – V. 1. –P. 109).
During the Second World War, few materials were added to the case, since Bandera was in a German concentration camp almost all the time. The first generalized reference is dated November 1944. It fragmentarily shows the milestones of the defendant's political activity. In particular, it is mostly about his arrests and stay in Polish and German camps, views and beliefs.
“According to the available intelligence data”, reads the paper, “Bandera now lives in Berlin, where Germans keep him under house arrest.
Both, throughout the entire period of the war and now, Bandera, with the direct support of the Germans, continues to wage an active struggle against the Soviet Union, sending spies, terrorists, saboteurs to our rear, and also organizes in our rear gang formations of the so-called “Ukrainian Insurgent Army”(UPA).
In order to destroy the Ukrainian nationalist underground and paralyze its active actions on the territory of the USSR, the 4th Directorate of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR has planned measures to liquidate Bandera S. A.
To this end, in the near future, a special group of 5-7 people will be formed of the tested qualified agents of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR, will be sent to Berlin (BSA of the SZR of Ukraine. – F. 1. – Case. 10876. – V. 2. –P. 541–542).
The fact that those intentions had a continuation and real embodiment is evidenced by other materials in the case file. Thus, among the archival documents there is a “Plan of Special Measures of the 4th Directorate of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR for the “Ovod” agent case, approved by the Deputy People's Commissar of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR Drozdetskyi on November 11, 1944. It clearly and unequivocally sets the task to assassinate S. Bandera.
To accomplish this task, it was supposed to create a special group, staff it with proven agents of the 4th and 2nd Directorates of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR, who worked along the line of struggle against Ukrainian nationalists. The groups had to include a radio operator with a walkie-talkie and 1-2 agents from the Germans who knew Berlin and its suburbs well and had reliable contacts among local residents. 30, 000 German marks were allocated for operational expenses.
Part of the group was to be located on the outskirts of Berlin, others – to legalize in the city and directly engage in tracking down and liquidating Bandera. For this purpose, necessary documents were supposed to be made. The group was meant to land from an aircraft in the first half of December 1944. “The group does not conduct combat operations”, the plan said. – “All its activities are subordinated exclusively to one task – to liquidate Bandera” (BSA of the SZR of Ukraine. – F. 1. – Case. 10876. – V. 3. –P. 78–80).
According to the Intelligence’s archival documents, the same plan was approved at the same time, on November 11, 1944, regarding the liquidation of Andriy Melnyk in Berlin. Another group under the code name “Vulcan” had to act separately according to the same scheme.
This way, the NKGB wanted to simultaneously assassinate both iconic figures of the Ukrainian national liberation movement to the sounds of artillery cannonade and bomb explosions and directly in the capital of the Third Reich, hiding its involvement and avoiding accusations of political terrorism.
No information was found in the archive about how those special groups acted in the future and whether they managed to get to Berlin at all. It is only known that A. Melnyk secretly left the capital of Germany on February 11, 1945 and went to the southwest to Bad Kissingen. S. Bandera with his family and close environment often changed their place of residence at that time. After the war, he was in the territory of West Germany, which was under the control of the USA, England and France. Such a conspiracy was connected with the fact that there was a demand from the Soviet side to the Western allies for his extradition.
All the postwar years, NKGB-MGB-KGB of the USSR tried to keep S. Bandera in their field of vision. They persistently collected information about his inner circle, in particular on close and distant relatives. To this end, they even made his detailed branched lineage. Among the relatives, they tried to find those who could be inclined to cooperate and thus approach him closer, and at the same time kept trying to assassinate him.
In the case file there are reports from Moscow, from the First (Intelligence) Main Directorate of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR dated October 15, 1946, that Stepan Bandera at that time lived near the city of Hof, located in the American zone of occupation of Germany and that a group of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs consisting of three people was officially sent there to search for him and bring him to the USSR. But that action of the Soviet special services was not successful, and the search continued for subsequent years. There is also a resolution approved by Deputy Minister of State Security of the USSR, Lieutenant-General Selivanovsky on March 31, 1949, on the arrest of the leader of OUN. It points out that S. Bandera was in the American zone of occupation of Germany and conducted active anti-Soviet activities. Therefore, a decision was made to arrest him if found.
Among other, hitherto unknown documents, of great interest is the “Plan of Intelligence and Operational Measures in the Case of “Fomin”, approved by Minister of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR Lieutenant-General Strokach on December 7, 1953. The case with such a name, as evidenced by the content of the document, was investigared in Moscow, where S. Bandera was given an operational pseudonym “Fomin”. The plan was supposed to find out through the agents the places of residence of the defendant in the case, to carefully interrogate members of OUN and UPA in order to find out new information about him, to do certain work through close relatives.
But special attention is attracted by paragraph 7 of the plan of the following content:
“In order to carry out special measures in the case of “Fomin” with a trip to the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR, to choose 10 people from among former insurgents- agents (expelled at different times) and special agents currently in use.
Of the most suitable agents, create 2 groups of 2 people each and, after appropriate work, prepare them for going abroad.
When selecting the agents, take into consideration the following: the selected agents should be physically fit, resilient, have a good command of using firearms, be tested and assigned to specific practical work, and be ready any minute to fulfill the task set by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Besides, the agents must have the necessary OUN or other contacts abroad, know the territory of Poland, Czechoslovakia, speak Polish, Czech or German...” (BSA of the SZR of Ukraine. – F. 1. – Case 10876. – V. 5. –P. 99–100).
In the text of the document, the word “special” was omitted and after printing it was inscribed by the operative by hand. In this way, even within the agency, measures for the physical destruction of persons were hidden from unnecessary publicity.
Among the insurgents - agents who were recruited to liquidate S. Bandera according to this plan there were agents “Sergey” and “Sedov”, former members of the OUN underground, captured and recruited by the Ministry of State Security in 1945-1948. According to their information, at that time, a number of OUN groups were defeated and a significant number of insurgents were killed. That is, they, as envisaged by the plan, were “tasked with specific practical matters”, namely, with killing former like-minded people.
At the same time, the plan is another confirmation that at that time the state security bodies practiced the paired use of agents- fighters to assassinate so-called enemies of the Soviet government. This was the case in one of the operations of that time to prepare for assassination of Minister of Military Affairs of the UPR government in exile Mykola Kapustyanskyi. Over time, preference was given to loners, as was the case with Bohdan Stashynskyi.
B. Stashynskyi (one of many code names -“Taras”) is almost for the first time mentioned in these archival documents precisely as a future candidate for the assassination of S. Bandera. For example, in a paper from Moscow dated December 23, 1953, it was reported that “Agent Taras” is suitable for use in “Fomin”’s case and included in the plan”. That is why, “Taras” was recommended not to be involved in other events.
Therefore, for almost six years, B. Stashynskyi was on the special list of the MGB -KGB as a possible candidate for the implementation of this political order. His path to the murder of Stepan Bandera, committed on October 15, 1959, development and implementation of the operation itself is described in detail in books and publications, materials of an open trial. The documents collected in the above mentioned case file are another important proof of the criminal essence of the Kremlin totalitarian regime of that time, which would try to kill its political opponents at the best opportunity, including during the war, arguing that everything can be written off onto war and political killings can be hidden from humanity.