Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Intelligence Service (1945–1955)

After the Second World War, the Soviet authorities mobilized huge forces against the Ukrainian national resistance movement in Western Ukraine. The Kremlin was aware that the activities of OUN and UPA hinder the process of establishment of communist power in Ukraine, have a negative impact on the moods in the society, and create the world community’s impression unfavorable for the communist regime.

Huge forces were deployed to suppress and defeat the underground. The underground suffered significant losses, but did not stop the struggle. The Ukrainian liberation movement proved to be well-organized, ideologically hardened and uncompromising in its desire to preserve its strength at any cost for further struggle for Ukraine's independence.

At the same time, the members of the resistance movement, who found themselves in a rather difficult situation, were forced to finally switch from offensive (insurgent) to defensive (deep underground) tactics of struggle. The new tactics consisted of conspiratorial actions in underground conditions and moving to the struggle with the use of small units. In this scheme of resistance, an important place, as during the Second World War, was given to intelligence and counter-intelligence.

The organizational structure of special units, as evidenced by documents from the archive of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine and other sources, was mainly carried out according to the territorial and functional principle. Intelligence structures were part of the ranks of the nationalist movement: central governing bodies, territorial units and armed formations of the UPA (until 1949).

The main directions of the intelligence work of the SB (Sluzhba Bezpeky – Security Service) of the OUN (b) in Western Ukrainian lands (1945–1950) were as follows:

- collecting intelligence on the Soviet authorities’ measures with the aim of organizing actions to disrupt them and supporting the life of the underground;

- obtaining information about the organization, forces and means, actions of bodies and troops of internal affairs and state security agencies, other Soviet military and paramilitary formations;

- accumulation of information about the administrative and political system, military and economic potential of the USSR.

The main prerequisite for the effectiveness of intelligence was the creation of an extensive intelligence and information network based on territorial and object features. The emphasis was no longer on the mass, but on the dedication, qualification and real intelligence abilities of the informants. In choosing informants, attention was focused on persons who lived legally and had sufficient intelligence abilities.

The main types of informants were as follows:

- “accidental”, i.e. persons who by chance had the opportunity to observe certain events or learn about something important from members of the underground or other persons (leaders of “kushches”(settlements) and ordinary members of the OUN, fighters);

- “trained”, i.e. specially trained individuals or underground workers who received purposeful instructions on gathering information.

Taking into account the fact that the main base of the resistance movement was villages, the basis of the intelligence network was informers in “kushches” (residents), who had 2-3 assistants. Accordingly, the kushch provids (leaderships) were the lowest link in the underground organizational network. District, supra-district, neighbourhood, and regional provids stood above. The OUN Provid in Ukraine was headed by Roman Shukhevych (until March 5, 1950) and Vasyl Kuk (until May 23, 1954).

Roman Shukhevych was directly involved in the organization of intelligence in the western Ukrainian lands, participated in the drafting of basic documents. In particular, he developed a special instruction on intelligence in the conditions of the city “Ihumen”. It provided for the collection and summarization of information under the following headings:

- general characteristics of the city (population, its national composition, presence of military units, industrial facilities, law enforcement agencies, industrial enterprises, state of communications);

- the population’s attitude to the authorities, national minorities, international events, ideas of the nationalist movement;

- military units, their weapons, level of training, soldiers’ moods;

- law inforcement bodies;

- party and Komsomol bodies;

- the state of industry, transport, social living conditions of workers;

- culture, everyday life, religious sphere;

- the situation of certain population groups (women, youth, etc.).

The post-war underground used several leading tactical schemes: “Dazhbog” (actions in the deep underground by small groups, aimed at the survival of OUN and opposition to the Soviet government); “Oleh” (education and preparation for struggle of youth cadres as the main source of replenishment of the resistance movement); “Orlyk” (spreading the influence of OUN to the eastern and southern regions of the Ukrainian SSR).

In 1950, the Security Service (Sluzhba Bezpeky - SB) of OUN established an information service. It was assumed that each referent of the SB from the district included should create a wide information network in settlements, state institutions, enterprises and collect data on the political and economic situation, military potential, and law enforcement agencies. All intelligence and information activities during that period were aimed first of all at ensuring the functioning of the underground, and secondly – at the performance of intelligence tasks that came from the governing bodies of OUN.

At the same time, UPA had a Ukrainian press service. The instructions regarding the activities of this service, which is kept in the archive of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine, points out: “The natural life force that stirred the nation to fight, the engine that pushed it to new tracks, is the Ukrainian armed force, which today is the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Each action of UPA is, on the one hand, a firm and unshakable step of the nation into the future, and on the other hand, it is the great past of the Ukrainian people. In view of this, it is necessary: ​​1) that the masses of Ukrainian and enslaved peoples should know as widely as possible about each action of UPA, and that the scale and heroic deeds of the young Ukrainian army should raise their spirits and strengthen their faith in their own strength. This will greatly help UPA to fulfill its task for the future. At the same time, we must not in any way allow the events of today to pass by without a trace, remaining in the memory of contemporaries only. Therefore: 2) the history that UPA is creating today with the help of bullets and bayonets must be recorded and passed on to future generations. For them, we must describe in detail all the paths we took to achieve our great goal, we must leave for them historical sources from which they would study and reproduce our great age, from which they would draw strength and inspiration for their work and struggle, like we draw it from the deeds of our predecessors” (BSA of the SZR of Ukraine. - F. 1. Case 7088. - V. 2. - P. 181).

After the death of R. Shukhevych, UPA gradually lost its fighting capacity. At the turn of 1952–1953, the underground broke up into local provids and groups. As a result, the intelligence and information work significantly narrowed.

The final termination of the organized underground resistance of OUN in Western Ukraine in the mid-1950s also marked the end of the intelligence activities of this organization in Ukraine. In the future, special units functioned in their entirety mainly within the boundaries of Ukrainian emigrant centers abroad.